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Margaret Berger and Aaron Twerski are among the leading scholars in
their respective fields of Evidence and Products Liability. I have benefited
from their work on many occasions. 1 Precisely because of the deserved re
spect and esteem in which Berger and Twerski are held-not to mention
the prominence of their forum, the Michigan Law Review their proposal
to create a new "informed choice" cause of action in pharmaceutical litiga
tion is likely to receive sympathetic attention. Because I believe that their
-

*

Professor, George Mason University School of Law; Visiting Professor, University of
Michigan Law School, 2005--06. B.A. 1988, Brandeis; J.D. 200 1 , Yale. -Ed. The author thanks
Michael Abramowicz, Ted Frank, Michael Green, Richard Nagareda, and Joseph Sanders for helpful
comments, and Dr. Robert Brent for reviewing the accuracy of this Article's discussion of the scien
tific evidence regarding Bendectin. Any remaining errors are the author's responsibility. The Law
and Economics Center at the George Mason University School of Law provided funding for this
Article.
1 . Among other things, I frequently refer to Professor Berger's Evidence treatise and use
Dean Twerski's casebook in my Products Liability class.
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proposal is ill-conceived and dangerous, I feel compelled (with some trepi
dation) to write this response.
Berger and Twerski propose that courts recognize an informed choice
cause of action that would allow plaintiffs claiming injury from pharmaceu
tical products to recover damages for deprivation of informed choice when
(1) the causal relationship between the toxic agent and plaintiff's harm is
unresolved at the time of litigation and will likely remain unresolved; (2) the
drug is not therapeutic but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or to
improve lifestyle; (3) it is almost certain that a patient made aware of the
risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption of the drug would
have refused to take it; and (4) defendant drug company was aware of the
potential risk or should have undertaken reasonable testing to discover the
risk and failed to provide the requisite information to the physician or pa
tient.2
These guidelines, however, are rather vague. Whether they are meant to
apply broadly or narrowly means the difference between a cause of action
that would open a Pandora's Box of litigation and one that would be avail
able only in limited, perhaps even extraordinary, circumstances. Apparently,
Berger and Twerski intend the scope of the informed choice action to be
broad indeed. So broad, in fact, that if adopted it could lead to an unprece
dented wave of litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers, including
lawsuits involving products that are completely safe and effective.
Berger and Twerski suggest that the paradigmatic example illustrating
the need for the informed choice cause of action is the failure of plaintiffs to
recover damages from the maker of Bendectin. The plaintiffs contended that
this morning sickness drug caused their children's birth defects. As demon
strated below, in Part I of this Essay, if the proposed informed choice tort's
boundaries are broad enough to allow the Bendectin plaintiffs to recover
damages, then they are extraordinarily, dangerously broad. Part II of this
Essay argues that even if Berger and Twerski had chosen a better example
that would allow for a much more limited interpretation of the scope of their
proposal, the proposal still has significant weaknesses that render it a very
bad idea.
I.

INFORMED CHOICE AND THE BENDECTIN TR AGEDY

Litigation claiming that Bendectin caused limb reduction and other birth
defects began in the late 1970s and did not end until at least 2000. It in
volved thousands of plaintiffs and tens of millions of dollars in defense
costs, and led to many pioneering judicial rulings excluding plaintiffs' scien
tific evidence. Most significant, Bendectin was the underlying subject of
3
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court case that

2. Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking
Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005).
3.

509 U.S. 579 (1 993).
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ushered in the modem era in which courts subject questioned expert testi
mony to meaningful scrutiny to ensure its reliability.
Perhaps because Berger and Twerski seek to "unmask" Daubert, they
invoke the Bendectin litigation to justify their informed choice proposal.
They suggest that although the Bendectin plaintiffs could not prove causa
tion, the Bendectin plaintiffs could have met the criteria they lay out for an
informed choice cause of action. If so, a review of the history of the Bendec
tin litigation reveals that their proposal is unjust, unworkable, and
counterproductive.
C riterion 1: The causal relationship between the toxic agent
and plaintiff's harm is unresolved at the time of litigation
and will likely remain unresolved.

Neither pioneering Bendectin plaintiff Betty Mekdeci-whose "an
4
guished cry" Berger and Twerski say they are responding to -nor any of
the subsequent Bendectin plaintiffs ever had sound reason to believe that
Bendectin caused limb reduction birth defects, the main focus of the Ben
dectin litigation. In 1977, when Mekdeci brought her lawsuit, fourteen
epidemiological studies of varying strength and quality had examined the
5
relationship between Bendectin and birth defects and found no association.
While these studies were not powerful enough to rule out some connection
between Bendectin and birth defects, they certainly provided no cause for
alarm. Bendectin had been on the market since 1956 with no serious doubts
raised regarding its safety in the scientific or medical community. Nor did
Bendectin contain suspiciously toxic ingredients: one active ingredient of
Bendectin was a simple B vitamin, and the other was an ingredient used in a
popular over-the-counter sleeping pill.
Meanwhile, Mekdeci's evidence that Bendectin did cause birth defects
6
was "remarkably thin." Many chemicals are known not to be teratogens in
humans, so the mere fact that pregnant women ingested a pharmaceutical
product such as Bendectin did not mean there was an inherent risk. Beyond
the mere fact that she ingested Bendectin during pregnancy and later gave
birth to a child with a limb reduction birth defect, Mekdeci's evidence of
causation consisted primarily of eighty-six reports to the FDA of other
women who had also given birth to children with limb reduction defects
7
after taking Bendectin. These reports are the direct source of Mekdeci's
complaint, implicitly endorsed by Berger and Twerski, that Bendectin's

4.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 289.

5.

JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 70 (1998).

6.

Id. at 7.

7.

MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECT 106, 124 (1997).

1964

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:1961

manufacturer should have warned of a possible association with birth de
fects.8
Berger and Twerski acknowledge that "[t]he mere fact that a child was
born with a limb reduction to a mother who had ingested Bendectin did not
9
necessarily point to Bendectin as the cause of the birth defect." In fact, the
mere fact that dozens or even hundreds of children were reported to have
been born with limb reductions after their mothers ingested Bendectin
doesn't, by itself, even suggest a risk. Approximately thirty million women
took Bendectin, and by chance alone there would be ten thousand limb re
duction defects among children born to these women. JO
Berger and Twerski apparently see the issue of whether Bendectin
caused birth defects as "unresolved" at the time of litigation. As noted
above, when the Bendectin litigation began, the relevant research was not
strong enough to rule out the possibility that Bendectin caused a small in
crease in birth defects, but there was no reason to rule in that possibility
either. T here was never any valid scientific evidence supporting the proposi
tion that Bendectin was a teratogen.
As interest in the teratogenicity of Bendectin increased due to the litiga
tion, evidence quickly piled up that Bendectin was safe. No animal studies
using doses equivalent or even substantially above human therapeutic doses
11
showed teratogenicity. Most epidemiological studies produced no statisti
12
13
cally significant findings. The few positive studies each found an
association with a different, unrelated birth defect, a pattern consistent with
random chance or imperfections in the studies, but not with causation by
14
Bendectin. Meanwhile, other studies reported a negative association be8. Mekdeci said: "I feel like there were certainly enough [adverse reactions of limb reduc
tion in children born after their mothers had taken Bendectin to alleviate symptoms of nausea]
reported, given our bad reporting system . . . to have warranted some kind of acknowledgment of
this on the labeling and to physicians." Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 257-58 (quoting Deposi
tion of Plaintiff Elizabeth Mekdeci).
Putting the case reports aside, should Ms. Mekdeci and others similarly situated have been
warned about potential birth defects, given that Bendectin had not been adequately tested to rule out
the possibility that it was a relatively weak teratogen? To the extent that physicians reportedly told
patients that Bendectin was proven "totally safe" before the 1980s, this information was inaccurate.
But given that there was no particular reason to believe that Bendectin caused birth defects, and, as
noted above, some reason to believe it didn't, Bendectin was logically in the category of many
pharmaceuticals prescribed to pregnant women today, with regard to which doctors say "we can't
absolutely guarantee it's safe, but any risk is minimal."
9.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 261.

Robert L. Brent, Bendectin: Review of the Medical Literature of a Comprehensively
Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent Tonogen-Litigen, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY
IO.

337, 340 (1995). It should also be kept in mind that obstetricians were especially likely to report a
temporal relationship between Bendectin ingestion and birth defects because of the still-fresh cau
tionary example of Thalidomide.
11.

Id. at 340.

12. Jeffrey S. Kutcher et al., Bendectin and Binh Defects II: Ecological Analyses, 67 BIRTH
DEFECTS REs, PART A: CLINICAL AND MOLECULAR ThRATOLOGY 88 (2003).
13.

See id. at 89.

14. Brent, supra note 10, at 339 (emphasizing the importance of consistency of results in
determining a "real" association).
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15
tween Bendectin and specific birth defects. Moreover, the results of spe
cific studies showing an association between Bendectin and various
16
unrelated birth defects were invariably not replicable. By the early 1980s,
there was a solid consensus in the medical community that Bendectin was
not a teratogen. Nevertheless, the litigation continued.
Berger and Twerski state that the manufacturer withdrew Bendectin
from the market "due to widespread fears that it caused severe birth defects
17
in the children whose mothers mgested the drug while pregnant." As with
1
other phantom risks, 8 however, the fears in question were the unreasonable
19
fears of the lay public-stirred by irresponsible interest groups, hired gun
20
and delusional experts, credulous media coverage, and plaintiffs' law
21
yers -not the fears of the manufacturer, the FDA, or the scientific
. 22
commuruty.
Over time Bendectin became the most-studied drug used during preg
nancy, and "the massive amount of data does not support a consistent
statistical association between Bendectin usage in pregnancy and a particu
23
lar syndrome or group of malformations." Two meta-analyses of the data
from all the epidemiological studies showed no association between Ben
24
dectin and birth defects. The negative epidemiological data are supported
by "ecological analyses" showing that the withdrawal of Bendectin from the

15.

See Kutcher et al., supra note 12, at 89.

16.

Brent, supra note 10, at 338-39.

17.

Berger

& Twerski, supra note 2, at 268.

18. See KENNETH R. FOSTER ET AL., PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW
32 (1993); David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REv. 457, 461 (1999) (book
review).

19.

The Public Citizen's Health Research Group consistently claimed, against the weight of

& Sheila R. Shulman, Bendectin and
the Language of Causation, in PHANTOM RISK, supra note 18, at 101, 107-09.
the evidence, that Bendectin was dangerous. Louis Lasagna

20. See, e.g., Mark Dowie & Carolyn Marshall, The Bendectin Cover- Up, MOTHER JONES,
1980, at 43; Expens Reveal . . . Common Drug Causing Deformed Babies, NAT'L ENQUIRER,
Oct. 9, 1979, at 20; John de St. Jorre, The Morning Sickness Drug Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1980 (Magazine), at 11.
Nov.

21.

Melvin Belli, in particular, was responsible for turning Mekdeci's lone case against Ben

dectin into a

flood of litigation, not least by feeding a dramatic story comparing Bendectin to
7, at 134, 183.

Thalidomide to the National Enquirer. See GREEN, supra note

22. See C. I. Barash & L. Lasagna, The Bendectin Saga: "Voluntary" Discontinuation, 1 J.
CLINICAL RES. DRUG DEV. 277 (1987). The FDA, reviewing a petition for approval of a generic
version of Bendectin in 1999, confirmed that Bendectin was not withdrawn from sale "for reasons
of safety or effectiveness." Determination that Bendectin Was Not Withdrawn From Sale for Rea

64 Fed. Reg. 43190 (Aug. 9, 1999); see also SANDERS, supra note 5,
31; Gideon Koren et al., Drugs in Pregnancy, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1128, 1129 (1998) (stating

sons of Safety or Effectiveness,
at

that Bendectin was withdrawn despite a substantial body of evidence that it was safe).

23.

Brent, supra note

10, at 338; see, e.g., Patricia H. Shiono & Mark A. Klebanoff, Bendec

tin and Human Congenital Ma/formations, 40 TERATOLOGY 151 (1989) (concluding that there is no
increase in the overall rate of major malformations after exposure to Bendectin).

24.

Kutcher et al., supra note 12, at

96.
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25
U.S. market did not lead to a reduction in any category of birth defects. A
2003 study concluded that the fact that the rate of birth defects remained
constant after Merrell Dow withdrew Bendectin from the market is not con
26
sistent with the hypothesis that Bendectin is a teratogen.
A review of the relevant medical literature finds a consensus that Ben
27
dectin is not a teratogen. Prominent teratologist Robert Brent concluded in
1995 that "[t]here has never been a drug that has been studied so completely
.. .. These data do not even suggest that Bendectin administration during
28
pregnancy represents a reproductive or teratogenic risk." The Food and
Drug Administration, the World Health Organization, and the March of
29
Dimes have all found that Bendectin is not a teratogen, as did (well before
30
the Bendectin litigation concluded) the governments of Canada, the United
31
Kingdom, Switzerland, West Germany, and Australia. Meanwhile, none of
the experts who testified for the plaintiffs in the Bendectin litigation has ever
published "an analysis, review, or research paper that indicated that Bendec
32
tin was a human teratogen."
If Berger and Twerski believe that the causal relationship between Ben
dectin and the birth defects of the Bendectin plaintiffs was "unresolved"
33
during the litigation (which continued through at least 2000! ) and (as I

25. Id. at 96; C. Ineke Neutel & Helen L. Johansen, Measuring Drug Efe
f ctiveness By De
fault: The Case of Bendectin, 68 CANADIAN J. Pue. HEALTH 66, 69-70 (1995).
26.

Kutcher et al., supra note

27.

Raafat Bishai et al., Critical Appraisal of Drug Therapy for Nausea and Vomiting of

12, at 96.

Pregnancy: II. Efficacy and safety of Diclectin (doxylamine-B6), 7 CANADIAN J. CLINICAL PHAR
MACOLOGY 138, 139 (2000) (stating that views that Bendectin is unsafe are "unsubstantiated fears
created by misinformation and misperceptions"); D. Jewell & G. Young, Interventions for Nausea
and Vomiting in Early Pregnancy, THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, 2003, Issue

4, Art. No.: CD000145 (remarking that observational studies show "no evidence of teratogenicity"
A. Magee et al., Evidence-Based View of Safety and Effectiveness of Phar
macologic Therapy for Nausea and Vomiting of Pregnancy (NVP), 186 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY S256 (2002) (concluding that Bendectin is "safe and effective" for treating morning
from Bendectin); Laura

sickness); P. Mazzotta et al., Attitudes, Management and Consequences of Nausea and Vomiting of

Pregnancy in the United States and Canada, 70 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 359, 360
(2000) (stating that claims that Bendectin has teratogenic effects "were subsequently proven to be
unsubstantiated"); Jennifer R. Niebyl, Overview of Nausea and Vomiting of Pregnancy with an Em

phasis on Vitamins and Ginger, 186 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S253, S254 (May 2002)
("[N]o other agent given in pregnancy has more conclusive safety data with regard to teratogenic
ity.").

28.

Brent, supra note

IO, at 343.

29. Thomas H. Strong, Jr., Alternative Therapies of Morning Sickness, 44 CLINICAL OB
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 653, 656 (2001).
30. See Melanie Ornstein et al., Bendectin/Diclectin for Morning Sickness: A Canadian
Follow-up of an American Tragedy, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 1, 2-3 (1995).
31.

See SANDERS, supra note 5, at 87.

32.

Brent, supra note

IO, at 344. In this context, it is significant that Berger and Twerski cite

none of the medical or scientific literature on either Bendectin or nausea and vomiting of pregnancy

(NVP). Had they done so, they would have found that while the Bendectin litigation and its ultimate
resolution may remain "controversial" among lawyers, the scientific and medical literature is abso
lutely one-sided.

33.

See Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d I (Pa. 2000).
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read their article) remains "unresolved" now, one struggles to conceive of
any purported causal relationship that they would acknowledge has been
resolved.
Criterion 2: The drug is not therapeutic but rather its purpose is
to avoid discomf011 or to improve lifestyle.

According to Berger and Twerski, the "assault on autonomy" through
lack of informed consent "is especially egregious in the case of lifestyle
drugs where the drug has little therapeutic value." They admit that "there is
no bright line that can be drawn between lifestyle and therapeutic drugs,"
34
but consider Bendectin to be a lifestyle drug. This suggests that the cate
gory of "lifestyle" drug is extremely broad.
Bendectin was used to treat symptoms of pregnancy commonly known
as morning sickness, and known in the medical literature as nausea and
vomiting of pregnancy ("NVP"). For some women, NVP is a very serious
complication of pregnancy. Approximately 1% of pregnant women require
35
hospitalization due to severe vomiting. More generally, women who ex
perience severe vomiting "are at increased risk for preeclampsia [a toxic
condition whose symptoms include high blood pressure], intrauterine
36
growth retardation, and hospitalization." A significant fraction of women
37
who suffer from severe NVP consider terminating their pregnancies. One
study found that approximately 3% of severe NVP sufferers have an abor
3
tion that they attribute to their desire to end their NVP symptoms. 8
For a much greater number of women, NVP is "merely" extremely un
pleasant and somewhat debilitating. Researchers estimate that NVP impairs
39
the daily routine of 35% of pregnant women.
Bendectin was the only FDA-approved drug to treat NVP.

40

Withdrawal

of Bendectin may have actually slightly increased birth defect rates, as
mothers with severe NVP have difficulty getting proper nutrition4 1 and some
pregnant women used "off-label" prescription remedies or "alternative"
therapies that had "little, if any, safety information" to relieve their suffermg. 42
•

34.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 288.

35.

Niebyl, supra note 27, at 253.

36.

Ornstein et al., supra note 30, at 1.

Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 364; Paolo Mazzotta et al., Factors Associated with
Elective Termination of Pregnancy among Canadian and American Women with Nausea and Vomit
37.

ing of Pregnancy, 22 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 7 (2001).

38.

Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 361.

39. Niebyl, supra note 27, at 253. Berger and Twerski dismiss NVP, apparently for all
women who suffer from it, as merely "the discomfort of nausea." Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at
288 n.149.
40.

Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 360.

41.

Neutel & Johansen, supra note 25, at 70.

42.

Strong, supra note 29, at 656.
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Several studies have compared the effects of NVP in the U.S. and Can
ada. One study found that in both countries, hospitalization rates for NVP
doubled when Bendectin was removed from the market following the litiga
43
tion scare of the early 1980s. Once Bendectin (in a generic version)
44
returned to the Canadian market in 1989, hospitalization rates declined in
Canada in parallel with increased prescriptions for the drug, while American
45
hospitalization rates remained constant. Another study concluded that
"American patients tended to lose, on average, more weight during their
NVP, were hospitalized more often than their Canadian counterparts despite
similar distribution of the severity of symptoms, and lost more time from
46
paid work." This study concluded that the absence of Bendectin had caused
47
"American women unwarranted and preventable suffering." The with
drawal of Bendectin from the market was, as one article puts it, "an
48
American tragedy."
C riterion 3: It is almost certain that a patient made aware of
the risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption
of the drug would have refused to take it.

Berger and Twerski argue that "[t]here is little doubt that the vast major
ity of expectant mothers suffering from the discomfort of morning sickness
would have refused to take Bendectin to alleviate their discomfort if told
that the drug carried with it an uncertain risk of birth defects to their fe
49
tuses." In fact, this depends on how the "risk" would have been portrayed.
If the risk was portrayed as "there is an uncertain risk of birth defects" from
Bendectin, Berger and Twerski are likely correct. If it was portrayed more
accurately as "we can never guarantee with absolute certainty that a drug
will not cause birth defects, but Bendectin has been used safely for over
twenty years, the FDA and the scientific community believe that it is the
only drug safe and effective for treating NVP, and there is no reputable evi
dence to the contrary," the vast majority of women would have reasonably
50
decided to take Bendectin to relieve NVP.
More generally, this raises the issue of what Berger and Twerski con
sider a "risk" worth informing patients about. Berger and Twerski are

43.

Ornstein et al., supra note 30, at 2-3.

44.

Id. at I .

45.

Id.

46.

Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 360.

47.

Id. at 365.

48.

Ornstein et al., supra note 30, at 1.

49.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 269.

This is how the risk should have been reasonably portrayed to women, and women with
50.
mild symptoms of NVP may have chosen to avoid even this "risk." The evidence suggests, however,
that some women were inaccurately told by their physicians that Bendectin was "proven safe." For
further discussion, see supra note 8.

August 2006]

"An American Tragedy"

1969

1
52
inspired in part by the Davii and Reyes cases, in which plaintiffs, whose

children contracted polio from the oral polio vaccine, sued the manufacturer
of the vaccine for not disclosing to patients the (well-established) one in a

million risk that the vaccine could itself cause polio. Yet a one in a million
risk is so small a risk that, prospectively, no reasonable person would worry
about it. Consider that over a two-year period, the average American has a
53
greater than a one in a million chance of being killed by a lightning strike.
The one in a million risk is put in even starker perspective when one recog
nizes that being vaccinated for polio actually significantly reduced the
54
overall risk of polio to the vaccinee.
More generally, a one in a million risk is so low that a drug manufac
turer could almost certainly never guarantee that an individual drug (or for
that matter, many food products!) poses less than this risk of birth defects.
Does that mean that every product ingested by women of childbearing age
need carry a warning, even if it has been studied extensively and shown not
to be teratogenic?
Or, returning to the Bendectin example, does the fact that a few outliers
and hired guns are willing to speculate that a drug causes birth defects mean
that there is a meaningful "risk" of birth defects? If so, every relevant phar
maceutical product sold in the United States should carry a warning about
any conceivable harm that any credentialed doctor or scientist could imagine
may arise from using it.
Criterion 4: Defendant drug company was aware of the potential risk or
should have undertaken reasonable testing to discover the risk and failed
to provide the requisite information to the physician or patient.

Berger and Twerski conclude that the risk of birth defects from Bendec
tin was a "material risk" that should have been disclosed to physicians or
patients because "it is impossible to rule out" the possibility that Bendectin

51.

Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).

52.

Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1974).

53. How Likely Are You to Be Struck by Lightning, http://www.stats.org/record.jsp?type=
news&ID=402 (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
54. The Davis court argued that while the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine was
approximately one in a million, the risk of contracting polio from other sources was also approxi
mately one in a million, so that a rational person might have chosen not to take the risk from the
vaccine. The court, however, failed elementary statistics, which points to the hazards of trusting the
judicial system with public risk management. The polio vaccine need be given only once, with the
one in a million risk providing lifelong immunity. The one in a million risk of contracting polio
otherwise was, by the court's own reckoning, annual, and thus, over a period of years, far greater
"
than the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine.
It's especially odd that Berger and Twerski use these cases as positive models because it was
undisputed in both cases that the risk from the polio vaccine was disclosed to the medical commu
nity. Berger and Twerski suggest, see Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 278, that drug
manufacturers would escape liability under their "failure to warn" tort if they "alert physicians so
they in turn can provide information to patients that will enable them to make a meaningful choice."
So by their own lights, the polio vaccine cases should be examples of litigation run amok.

1970
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The primary allegation against Bendectin was that it

caused "limb reduction" birth defects, as in the Mekdeci case, but plaintiffs
in other cases alleged that Bendectin caused many other, unrelated, fetal
problems, ranging from mental retardation to cleft lip to deafness to club
57
5
feet, 6 and including even genetic defects. As with limb reduction defects, it
is "impossible to rule out" the possibility that Bendectin causes any of these
defects, because "proving that Bendectin does not cause birth defects is
58
logically impossible." Under the informed choice proposal, these plaintiffs,
like Ms. Mekdeci, would deserve compensation for lack of informed con
5
sent for the nonexistent "risk" to which they were exposed. 9
Thus, considering the four informed choice criteria discussed above in
the context of Bendectin, one concludes that a pharmaceutical manufacturer
could be held liable for failure to provide informed choice: (a) even when
there was never any sound scientific evidence suggesting that the product
caused the harm at issue and there was an unbroken consensus among lead
ing experts in the field that the product did not cause such harm; (b) when
the product prevented serious harm to a significant number of patients and
prevented substantial discomfort to a much greater number, even when there
were no available alternative products; (c) when a plaintiff claims that she
would not have taken the product had she been informed of an incredibly
remote and completely unproven risk; and (d) when the defendant is unable
to do what will generally be impossible, that is, prove that there is no possi
bility that the product in question causes the harm alleged. The example of
Bendectin, then, suggests that adoption of the informed choice proposal
would be an epic mistake.

55.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 280.

56.

Brent, supra note JO, at 342.

57. Robert Brent, Bendectin and Binh Defects: Hopefully the Final Chapter, 67 BIRTH DE
FECTS RES. 79, 82 (2003).
58. Lasagna & Shulman, supra note 1 9, at 109. One cannot, as a general matter, prove a
negative, and certainly not with epidemiological studies or other tools currently at scientists' dis
posal. See Margaret A. Berger, Convening Unknown Risk into Phantom Risk, in Books-on-Law:
Book Reviews (Sept. 1 999), http://jurist.Iaw.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revsep99.htm#Berger (reviewing
PHANTOM RtsK, supra note 1 8) ("Epidemiological studies are incapable of proving that something
has no effects . . . . ).
"

59. Indeed, Berger and Twerski might allow these plaintiffs to be compensated if they were
not apprised of the risk of limb reduction defects even though their children did not suffer this par
ticular problem. They praise Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1 997), a case in which the
plaintiffs were unable to produce any expert evidence of a relationship between the mother's inges
tion of Provera and their baby's limb reduction defect. The court nevertheless allowed recovery for
"wrongful birth" because the plaintiff's physician failed to warn that at the time of her pregnancy,
there was concern that Provera caused congenital defects, including limb reductions. Had the mother
been warned she may have aborted the child. The dissent eviscerates the majority's logic, which
eliminates proximate cause from the tort of wrongful birth.
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BROADER C RITIQUE OF THE INFORMED C HOICE PROPOSAL

Quite properly, Berger and Twerski might protest that their proposal
60
shouldn't stand or fall on the poorly chosen example of Bendectin. There
may very well be another product-say, Parlodel, which Berger and Twerski
also discuss-whose history would support an informed choice cause of
action under a far narrower interpretation of the proposed criteria. However,
the informed choice proposal would still have weaknesses that make it a
very bad idea, as discussed below.
A. The Proposal Invites Reliance on Unreliable Testimony
Berger and Twerski note that a great deal of marginal testimony on cau
sation in toxic torts cases has been excluded under the Daubert trilogy.
However, they argue that much of this testimony would be admissible in an
informed choice action. Defendants would be hard-pressed, they argue, to
successfully challenge plaintiffs' experts on their ability to assess risk, given
61
that they generally have the appropriate academic credentials.
Risk assessment experts with appropriate credentials will certainly be
qualified to appear as experts. Federal Rule of Evidence

702 (incorporating

and clarifying the Daubert trilogy), however, requires that testimony by a
qualified expert ( 1) be "based upon sufficient facts or data", (2) be "the
product of reliable principles and methods," and (3) "appl[y] the principles
62
and methods reliably to the facts of the case." These criteria apply to risk
assessment as much as to causation testimony. As Berger and Twerski argue,
63
in specific cases, expert testimony based on a mosaic of evidence from
sources that are frequently excluded when used to prove causation-such as
64
65
66
anecdotal evidence, animal studies, chemical structure analysis, in vitro

60.

But see note 59 and accompanying text (noting that Berger and Twerski praise highly

questionable court decisions on other issues).
61.

Berger and Twerski earlier sound a more cautionary note, stating that "courts will have to

remain alert to the dangers of allowing junk science to enter the courtroom" and that courts should
ferret out "unworthy and frivolous claims." Berger

& Twerski, supra note 2, at 280. But their later

focus on the credentials of expert risk assessors suggests an unduly narrow interpretation of "junk
science" and "unworthy and frivolous claims." Id.
62.

FED. R. Evm. 702.

63.

See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (popularizing
the "mosaic" concept in toxic tort litigation).

64. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 91-92 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing the
general unreliability of anecdotal evidence of causation).
65.

For articles noting the difficulty of extrapolating teratogenicity to humans from animal

studies, see, for example, Koren et al., supra note 22, at 1131; Louis Lasagna, Predicting Human

Drug Safety from Animal Studies: Current Issues, 12 J. TOXICOLOGICAL Sc1. 439, 442-43 (1987).
Similar problems arise with regard to animal studies and cancer.
66.

See Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042, 1054 (D.N.J. 1992), ajf'd, 6

F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that there is no evidence that Bendectin is associated with birth
defects simply because other drugs with similar chemical structures are associated with birth de
fects).
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67

6
and preliminary epidemiological studies 8--could, taken together,
69
be sufficient to objectively warrant a warning about a product. But the
studies,

mere fact that a "qualified" adversarial expert is willing to testify that a
product was sufficiently risky to require a warning does not make his testi
mony sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702.
In addition to the stringent requirements of Rule 702, there are sound
reasons why courts are skeptical of "mosaic" testimony. The essential prob
lem is that extrapolating from various types of evidence that are individually
of dubious value to determine the riskiness of a product or substance inevi
tably requires a certain amount of educated guesswork and even speculation.
In a typical courtroom setting, however, the experts engaging in this guess
work and speculation will not be neutral scientists chosen because of their
expertise and objectivity. They will instead be adversarial experts chosen by
the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' attorney knows that they are willing to
testify that they agree with his theory of the case.
The problem with such adversarial experts is twofold. First, the experts
in question may be hired guns "who view their role less as helping the trier
7
of fact and more as aiding the cause of the attorneys who hired them." 0 Sec
71
ond, given liberal expert qualification standards,
especially for medical
testimony, many "qualified" experts who are chosen to testify in toxic torts
cases are outliers who hold views far outside the mainstream of their profes
sions, with little if any valid evidence supporting their views. Over the
years, the courts have been flooded with qualified experts who seem to be
7
lieve sincerely in various forms of quackery. 2
Between the outlier problem and the hired gun problem, plaintiffs attor
neys have had no difficulty finding qualified experts willing to testify to
73
causal relationships lacking sound scientific support, even when, as was
the case with Bendectin, a solid line of epidemiological studies contradicted
67. See Brent, supra note 10, at 342 (stating that in vitro studies "can never establish human
teratogenicity by themselves").
68. See Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces its Umits, 269 SCIENCE 1 64 ( 1 995) (noting that
epidemiology is subject to systematic errors, biases, and confounders).
69. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NAT'L ACADS., DIETARY
S UPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SAFETY 255-60 (2004).
70.

DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE§ 1 .2 (2004).

71.

Id.§2. 1 .

72. For example, for decades, many qualified experts testified that physical trauma to a body
part can cause cancer. More recently, qualified experts have testified that minor exposure to radia
tion causes a huge increase in cancer risk, and that exposure to chemical fumes can cause the body's
immune system to shut down, leaving the victim "allergic to everything." See FOSTER ET AL., supra
note 1 8, at 299-317, 359-99. Qualified experts have also provided extremely tendentious testimony
in asbestos litigation, finding that almost every person referred to them by plaintiffs' attorneys has
been harmed by asbestos exposure, however minimal. See David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science
Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 1 1 (2003); cf In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F.
Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing in excruciating detail the inadequacies and unreasonable
ness of plaintiffs' experts' testimony).
73. See generally FOSTER ET AL., supra note 18 (discussing expert testimony on various
causation issues that was at variance with the consensus of scientific research and opinion on those
issues).

August 2006)

"An American Tragedy "

1973

their views. It would likely be even easier to find an expert willing to testify
to his purchased or idiosyncratic views regarding a mere risk. Given the fact
that "[s]cience can never demonstrate the absence of hazard, still less the
absence of 'reasonable' grounds for anxiety," but "can only place an upper
74
limit on risk," fear of professional embarrassment is less likely to deter
experts from speculating regarding risk than regarding causation. While ex
cluding mosaic evidence may lead to some "false negatives," it is likely to
exclude far more "false positives," and courts would be well-served to de
75
mand a guarantee of reliability beyond the say-so of the adversarial expert.
An additional and related problem with the Berger and Twerski proposal
is that it would present an irresistible lure to interest groups to promote
junk-science-based lawsuits that would further their goals. One can already
point to many examples of interest groups helping to spawn and sustain liti
gation based on extremely weak evidence where the plaintiffs were, at least
76
in theory, required to meet traditional causation requirements. It would be
even easier for interest groups to stir up or engage in litigation when all that
is required for victory is some marginal evidence of "risk."
For example, several preliminary epidemiological studies-more evi
dence than the Bendectin plaintiffs ever had-have suggested that abortion
77
increases the risk of breast cancer. Even though those studies have since
78
been debunked, anti-abortion groups have nevertheless seized on them to
argue that women should be warned about the risk of breast cancer before
they can have abortions. Under the informed choice proposal, it would seem
to logically follow that abortion providers should be subject to lawsuits by
7
women who had abortions and later contracted breast cancer. 9

74.

Id. at 435.

75. For example, courts confronted with what appears to be speculative, but potentially
accurate, "mosaic" evidence, as in the Parlodel litigation, could use their authority under Federal
Rule of Evidence 706 and state equivalents to call a panel of neutral experts to evaluate the plain
tiffs' causation claim. See Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(doing exactly that). But that is a subject for another article.
76. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 32-33 (mentioning oral contraceptives, Bendectin,
dioxin, and PCBs); Bernstein, supra note 18, at 46�6, 469-70 (discussing silicone breast im
plants).
77.

E.g., Janet R. Daling, Risk of Breast Cancer Among Young Women: Relationship to In

duced Abortion, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1584 (1994); Holly L. Howe et al., Early Abortion and
Breast Cancer Risk among Women under Age 40, 18 INT. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 300 (1989); Polly A.
Newcomb et al., Pregnancy Termination in Relation to Risk of Breast Cancer, 275 J. AM. MED
.

Ass'N 283 (1996); M.C. Pike et al., Oral Contraceptive Use and Early Abortion as Risk Factors for
Breast Cancer in Young Women, 43 BRIT. J. CANCER 726 (1981).
78. See, e.g. , Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis of
Data from 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast Cancer from 16 Coun
tries, 363 LANCET 1007, 1016 (2004); Committee on Gynecologic Practice, American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG Committee Opinion: Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer
Risk, 83 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 233 (2003).

79. Indeed, though they analogize their tort to informed consent in medical practice, Berger
and Twerski's proposal could easily be expanded beyond the medical context, and permit individu
als to sue based on lack of informed consent to the purported risks from fluoride in the drinking
water, pesticide residue on fruit, brief exposure to carbon monoxide in parking garages, and so on.
Certainly, dentists would be on the hook for not warning patients of the "risk" from mercury in
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B. Juries Are Not Competent to Determine Subtle
Risk Assessment Issues

Berger and Twerski write that their proposal requires juries to decide
"whether the signs of risk and their potential gravity were sufficiently strong
to require a drug manufacturer to alert physicians so that they in tum can
provide information to patients that will enable them to make a meaningful
choice."80 Such risks need not be "significant enough to warrant forceful or
drastic action by the FDA such as requiring black box warnings or removing
1
the drug from the market."8 Yet, if data supporting the existence of risk was
discovered after the company made its decision not to warn, there is little
reason to believe that jurors (or judges) are competent to make such subtle
determinations.82 After all, they have no expertise in science in general or
risk assessment in particular, are privy only to paid adversarial expert testi
3
mony, and are subject to hindsight bias.8
Indeed, juries have often proven themselves incapable of making "easy"
scientific determinations--often finding, for example, in favor of Bendectin
and breast implant plaintiffs despite a lack of reliable evidence on even gen
eral causation.84 Juries are even less likely to accurately resolve far more
difficult and subtle claims of "failure to warn of a risk that the defendant
knew or should have known but that doesn't rise to the level where the FDA
should take action."
Ironically, Twerski himself has warned against open-ended failure-to
warn schemes precisely because juries have no sound way of making the
determinations required, concluding that "the standards governing failure
to-warn negligence claims provide restraints on jury discretion that are so
inadequate as to be virtually nonexistent. . . . [T]he problem resides in the
fact that the standards governing failure to warn too frequently rely on un-

fillings. See, e.g., Amalgam/Mercury Dental Filling Toxicity, http://www.holisticmed.com/dental/
amalgam/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). For the scientific evidence, see Stephen Barrett, The Mercury
Amalgam Scam: How Anti-Amalgamists Swindle People, QUACKWATCH, Nov. 18, 2004, http://
www.quackwatch.org/O I QuackeryRelatedTopics/mercury.html, and ADA Statement on Dental
Amalgam (2002), http://www.ada.org/prof/resources/positions/statements/amalgam.asp.
80.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 278.

81.

Id.

82.
See generally Isaac M. Lipkus et al., General Performance on a Numeracy Scale among
Highly Educated Samples, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 37, 37 (2001) (concluding that "even highly

educated participants have difficulty with relatively simple numeracy questions"). The problem of
lack of jury competence to deal with complex scientific issues is recognized throughout the common
law world. See David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21
YALE J. INT'L L. 123 (1996)
83.
See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hind
sight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 2 (1998).
84.

For Bendectin, see SANDERS, supra note 5, at 118; for breast implants, see Bernstein,

supra note 18. A more recent example is "toxic mold" cases. See Daniel Fisher, Dr. Mold, FORBES,
Apr. 11, 2005, at I00.
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85
available data and unverifiable facts." Twerski's critique applies precisely
to his and Berger's informed choice proposal.
C. Even Assuming Juror Competence, the Proposal
Asks Too Much of Juries

Berger and Twerski argue that informed choice plaintiffs should also be
permitted to present evidence of causation to the jury. The court would rule
on the Rule 702 issue with regard to causation only at the end of the trial. If
the court excluded that evidence, "[p]laintiffs would then be free to use the
86
testimony of their experts to support their claim for informed choice."
The jury, then, would be in the position of knowing that qualified ex
perts, relying on what these experts (but not the non-expert judge) believe to
be reliable evidence, think that the product in question more likely than not
caused the plaintiff's horrible injury; that plaintiff has, due to this injury,
suffered grievous and costly physical and emotional harm; and, potentially,
that the defendant has allegedly engaged in all sorts of misconduct warrant
ing punitive damages. The jury is then supposed to ignore the causation and
damages evidence they just heard and dispassionately decide whether the
evidence of "risk" presented by the plaintiff 's experts warrants granting the
plaintiff emotional distress damages based on lack of informed choice,
knowing that if they rule for the defendants on this issue, the plaintiff will
receive no compensation.
To expect such dispassion after juries hear evidence on both causation
and damages requires an unwarranted belief in the ability of juries both to
ss
87
follow limiting instructions and to ignore their emotions. The latter is
especially problematic because good trial attorneys are masters at appealing
s9
to juries' emotions. One likely outcome in many informed choice cases
would be that jurors would implicitly shift the burden to defendants to prove
90
that there was no risk worth warning about. Because, as noted previously,

85. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 290 (1 990).
86.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 287.

87.

Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information ? The Difficulty of

Deliberately Disregarding, 1 53 U. PA. L. REv. 1 25 1 , 1 260--76 (2005) (reviewing the evidence that

individuals in general, and jurors in particular, are frequently unable to willfully ignore relevant
information, and that, in fact, j urors sometimes give more weight to evidence they are told to ig
nore).
88. See Kari Edwards & Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to
Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsvcHoL.
BULL. 849, 856 ( 1 997) (concluding that information that elicits emotions is especially difficult to
ignore).
89. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS 237-62 (2003) (detailing "[t]he [a]rt of
the [r]unaway [j]ury"); Bernstein, supra note 1 8, at 495-96 (providing examples from the breast
implant litigation).
90.

Such implicit burden-shifting already occurs even with regard to causation issues. See,

e.g. , Bernstein, supra note 1 8, at 496 (providing an example from the breast implant litigation).

Such burden-shifting would not necessarily trouble Professor Berger, who has previously advocated
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science can't prove a negative, this would mean that the defendants would
generally lose.
D. The Proposal Ignores the Problems Inherent to Multiple Trials
Let's assume arguendo that despite the problems noted above, 90% of
juries reach the objectively correct conclusion on informed choice claims. A
manufacturer of a popular and perfectly safe product could still face thou

sands of successful claims.

For example, even with a 90% success rate, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti
cals, manufacturer of Bendectin, could have faced liability from over twenty
thousand women who claimed that they should have been warned that Ben
1
dectin could cause heart defects in their offspring.9 The efficient response
for Merrell Dow once this success rate became clear would have been to
settle all two hundred thousand plus claims for ten cents on the dollar. If
each successful plaintiff was awarded an average of fifty thousand dollars in
"dignitary" damages, Merrell Dow would have been forced to pay over one
billion dollars, and would also have been on the hook for the expenses and
distractions of litigation. In fact, this may significantly underestimate poten
tial damages, as Berger and Twerski do not suggest any standards that would
constrain jury awards, and juries would undoubtedly feel sympathy for
plaintiffs whose children were born with significant birth defects. No ra
tional legal system would expose innocent manufacturers to such risk.92
E. The Proposal Fails to Consider the Potential Costs
of Informed Choice Litigation

One cost of informed choice litigation involves those who, out of fear
generated by the publicity attending lawsuits (often stoked by plaintiffs'
attorneys and public relations firms they hire), avoid using a safe product
that could be useful to them. For example, as a result of the Bendectin litiga
tion many women fail to get treatment for nausea during pregnancy because
3
of unfounded fears of teratogenicity.9 For that matter, many doctors became
burden-shifting in certain toxic torts cases. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation:
Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2 1 17, 2 1 44-45 ( 1 997).
I criticize Berger's proposal and like-minded proposals, while suggesting an alternative mechanism
for encouraging corporations to engage in appropriate behavior with regard to risk, in Bernstein,
supra note 1 8.

9 1 . Brent, supra note I0, at 340 (noting that statistically, one would expect that collectively
the women who ingested Bendectin would give birth to two hundred and forty thousand children
with congenital heart malformations, the same ratio as for women not exposed to Bendectin).
92. Another possibility, explicitly raised by Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 287-88, is
that in the absence of any requirement of individualized inquiry-which generally prevents pharma
ceutical cases from being aggregated-informed choice claims would typically be aggregated into
massive class actions. This would put defendants in the position of either betting the company on
favorable jury verdicts or settling, likely for significantly more than the underlying value of the
individual claims. The author thanks Richard Nagareda for suggesting that I address this point.
93.

Paolo Mazzotta et al., The Perception of Teratogenic Risk by Women with Nausea and

Vomiting of Pregnancy 1 3 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 3 1 3 (1 999); Koren et al., supra note 22.
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afraid to recommend any medication for NVP, including a version of Ben
dectin

that

ingredients.94
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be
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over-the-counter

Publicized warnings of purported risks "may create stress whether the
5
warnings are realistic or not."9 Some individuals may even engage in truly

risky or damaging actions to avoid a phantom risk. Publicity over Bendec
tin 's purported association with birth defects led at least seven women to
abort their unborn children because they were afraid that their ingestion of
Bendectin would lead to birth defects.96 Many women unnecessarily had
their breast implants explanted after claims that implants are associated with

immune system disease or cancer were circulated in the media by litigants
7
and activist groups.9 Others underwent costly, unnecessary, and risky treat

ments to combat nonexistent implant-related ailments; many more delayed
getting treatment for the true underlying causes of their medical problems.98

Parents hesitated to vaccinate their children because of unsubstantiated
claims, currently pending in a major class action, that thimerosal, a pre
servative used until recently in vaccines, causes autism.99 And so on.
Another cost of contentious litigation over scientific issues is the burden
it places on the scientific community. Litigation often leads to onerous dis
covery requests to, or even harassment of, scientists whose work on the
issue conflicts with one side's legal position. For example, a scientist who
conducted a study on Bendectin reports that an attorney subpoenaed all of
the original records involved in the study, including 4,500 interviews, com
1
puter tapes, and all printed computer output. 00 This material was never used
by the attorney. Epidemiologists conducting research on breast implants
were subpoenaed to provide "huge quantities of primary data in a reportedly
1 1
intimidating manner." 0
Finally, there is the cost to innovation. For example, unjustified litigation
over products such as Bendectin, spermicides, and birth control pills spurred

94.

See Gina Kolata, Controversial Drug Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at

Fl.
95. Paul R. Lees-Haley & Richard S. Brown, Biases in Perception and Reporting Following
a Perceived Toxic Exposure, 75 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 5 3 1 , 532 ( 1992).
96.

Strong, supra note 29, at 656.

97. See, e.g., Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 880 ( I0th Cir. 2005) (noting
that plaintiff had her implants removed because of fear that they were causing "silicone-induced
lupus").
98. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE Ct.ASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 147- 1 5 1 ( 1 996).
99. For the latest media hysteria on this issue, see Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Deadly Immunity,
SALON.COM, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/06/ l 6/thimerosal/index I .html. For a thorough
debunking, see Salon.com Hushes its Credibility Down the Toilet, http://oracknows.blogspot.com/
2005/06/saloncom-flushes-its-credibility-down.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
100. Michael B. Bracken, A/arums False, A/arums Real: Challenges and Threats to the Future
of Epidemiology, 8 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 79, 80 (1998).
101.

Id.
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10
a decline in contraceptive research; 2 unjustified lawsuits against vaccines
03
1
led to a decline in vaccine research;
and unjustified lawsuits against breast
1 04
implants threatened entire categories of medical products research.
At least in federal court, Rule 702, incorporating and clarifying the
Daubert trilogy, has removed much of the danger of liability for causation

based on unreliable evidence. But Berger and Twerski would have plaintiffs
get around Rule 702 by suing for informed choice. While successful in
formed choice actions would individually be less remunerative for plaintiffs
1 05
than successful causation actions would be,
it would be much easier for
plaintiffs to meet the burden of proof and persuade judges and j uries to rule
in their favor. Pharmaceutical companies would therefore likely face far
more lawsuits for lack of informed choice than they ever faced for causa
tion. Under such circumstances, "[ w]ho in his right mind . . . would work on
06
a product that would be used by pregnant women?"1

F. The Informed Choice Proposal Would Lead
to a Vast Surfeit of Warnings

Berger and Twerski acknowledge that "there is little social utility in pro
viding information that is so tentative and unreliable that it will serve no
purpose other than to frighten patients who need the drug away from its
07
use." 1 But given the issues discussed above, if drug manufacturers wanted
to immunize themselves from unpredictable and potentially unlimited liabil
ity, they would, if courts found that it shielded them, likely warn doctors and
patients about every conceivable risk. Perhaps a standard disclaimer along
the lines of "this drug has been proven safe and effective to the satisfaction
of the FDA, but it may cause birth defects, cancer, stroke, hypertension,
hives, convulsions, sexual dysfunction and [use your imagination]" would
become standard. Such defensive warnings would be worse than useless
they would diminish the impact and credibility of warnings based on sub-

102. Peter Huber, Litigation Thwarts Innovation in the U.S. , SCI. AM., Mar. 1989, at 1 20; see
also Elizabeth B. Connell, The Cost of Frivolous Lawsuits, FAMILY PRACTICE NEWS, Jan. 1 5 , 2004,
at 1 4, available at http://www.familypracticenews.com/article/PIIS03007073047 1 2220/fulltext.
103. See, e.g., Henry I. Miller, How Lawsuits Can Kil/, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE,
Dec. 9, 2004, available at http://www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=FLU- 1 2-0904.
104.

See Bernstein, supra note 1 8.

105.
Disturbingly, however, Berger and Twerski praise the New Jersey Supreme Court's opin
ion in Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1 999), in which a victim of lack of "informed choice,"
resulting in "wrongful birth," was awarded damages not just for emotional injury, but for the cost of
raising a baby with a birth defect, despite the absence of evidence from plaintiffs' experts of a con
nection between the defect and the product ingested.
1 06. See Huber, supra note 102 (quoting an anonymous president of a pharmaceutical com
pany, speaking in 1 986 of the litigation-oriented disincentives to engage in such research).
107.

Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 279.
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properly weigh the risks and benefits of a product.

1

8

G. The Informed Choice Proposal May Be Barred
by the Preemption Doctrine

In a case involving an allegation that Pfizer failed to warn of the alleged
risk of suicide from taking Zoloft, the FDA filed an amicus brief arguing
that "[t]o require a warning of a supposed danger that FD A concludes has
no actual scientific basis, no matter the warning's language, would be to
require a statement that would be false and misleading, and thus contrary to
1 09
federal law."
The FDA, for example, would not have approved a label
warning that Bendectin may cause birth defects, and, according to the FDA
(and at least one district court), any common law claim based on failure to
10
warn that Bendectin may cause birth defects would be preempted. 1 While
the FDA's position is thus far a minority view among federal courts that
111
have addressed the issue,
the ultimate outcome of the preemption issue
awaits Supreme Court decision.
CONCLUSION

The specific problems Berger and Twerski purport to address with their
informed choice proposal-the inadequacy of premarket review for detect
ing small but material risks from pharmaceutical products and the failure of
the current federal regulatory system to adequately address postmarket
112
safety review-are serious ones.
But given the inability of the tort system

1 08. See Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 1 87 (4th Cir. 1 99 1 ) ("If pharmaceutical companies
were required to warn of every suspected risk that could possibly attend the use of a drug, the con
suming public would be so barraged with warnings that it would undermine the effectiveness of
these warnings.") (emphasis in original); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 85, at 296 ('The most
significant social cost generated by requiring [defendants] to warn against remote risks is the re
duced effectiveness of potentially helpful warnings directed towards risks which are not remote.").
For a discussion of some of the difficulties consumers face in deciphering even rather basic pharma
ceutical safety information, see P. Knapp et al., Comparison of Two Methods of Presenting Risk
Information to Patients About the Side Effects of Medicines, 1 3 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH
CARE 176 (2004).
1 09. Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross
Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court's Order Denying Partial Summary Judg
ment to Defendant-Appellee & Cross-Appellant at 2, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.
2004) (Nos. 02-5537 1 , 02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084, at *2.
I JO.

Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 89, 1 198 (D.N.D. 2002), ajf'd on other

ground, 367 F.3d 1 0 1 3 (8th Cir. 2004).

1 1 1.

See Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 3d 876 (E.D. Tex. 2005).

1 1 2. See Funmilayo 0. Ajayi et al., Adverse Drug Reactions: A Review of Relevant Factors,
40 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1 093, 1 099 (2000) (concluding that the safety profile of a newly
marketed drug cannot be fully understood until two to three years after it reaches the market);
Charles L. Bennett et al., The Research on Adverse Drug Events and Reports (RADAR) Project, 293
J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 2 1 3 1 (2005); Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, Postmarketing Surveil
lance and Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Perspective and Future Needs, 28 1 J. AM. MED. Ass'N
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as it is currently situated to address product safety in general-and drug
safety in particular-in a rational, scientifically justifiable manner, the least
attractive possible response to the postmarket review problem is to create a
new, broad, open-ended common law tort. The tort conceived by Berger and
Twerski is especially problematic because it virtually invites attorneys to
bring claims based on junk science, fails to take any account of the limita
tions of juries, and would almost certainly have counterproductive overall
safety effects. In fact, the proposed informed choice tort seems more de
signed to allow plaintiffs an end run around Daubert/Rule 702 than to
113

address the problems noted above.

11
By contrast, Professor Catherine Struve has recently proposed 4 a hybrid

qui tam system, subject to opt-in or opt-out by drug companies, that ( 1 ) is a

clever rejoinder to the advocates of absolute FDA preemption; (2) takes de
termination of the scientific merits of claims that a company is concealing a
hazard away from random panels of lay jurors and gives it to scientific ex
perts at the FDA; and (3) provides incentives for potential claimants to
discover real hazards instead of giving plaintiffs' attorneys incentives to pur
1 5
sue lucrative, albeit bogus, cases. 1 While this brief response is not the
appropriate forum for a full-fledged discussion of Struve's proposal, I com
mend it to readers as a starting point for thinking about how better
116
postmarket review of pharmaceutical safety can be achieved.

824 (1999) (discussing the incompleteness of premarket trials); D. M. Roden, An Underrecognized
Challenge in Evaluating Postmarketing Drug Safety, 1 1 1 CIRCULATION 246 (2004).
1 1 3. Otherwise, why require that the plaintiff show that she actually suffered the injury not
warned against? Why not let all consumers deprived of their "dignity" through lack of informed
choice, injured or not, sue? Also, if Dean Twerski is not implicitly endorsing an end run around
Daubert I find it very difficult to reconcile his advocacy of an informed choice tort with his scathing
critique of emotional distress damages for asymptomatic asbestos plaintiffs. See James A. Hender
son, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-based Recovery for
Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S .C L. REV. 8 1 5 (2002). Not to men
tion that part of the article's title is "Unmasking Daubert."
Berger and Twerski do raise significant concerns regarding whether Daubert as interpreted by
Rule 702 is sometimes too burdensome for plaintiffs with legitimate causation claims. To the extent
that such concerns are valid, they need to be directly addressed in a way that permits valid claims to
proceed without reopening the floodgates to junk science, not indirectly through a poorly conceived
informed choice action.
.

1 14. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Com
pensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y, L. & ETHICS 587 (2005).
1 1 5.
I briefly sketched a system that would provide incentives for knowledgeable "insiders" to
report safety hazards ignored by corporations. See supra note 1 8. My approach is consistent with,
though different from, Struve's.
1 1 6. A more radical solution to the problem of asymmetries in (and the absence of) informa
tion regarding pharmaceutical safety would be to create information markets to predict the
probability that the manufacturer or the FDA will, over some long time horizon, permanently recall
or revoke permission to distribute a drug. See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Adminis
trative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 7 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 992-93
(2004). A potential problem with this proposal is that it may provide information market investors
with an incentive to spread false information about a product. Merrell Dow pulled Bendectin from
the market because of a successful public relations campaign by plaintiffs' attorneys with a financial
interest in demonizing these products, not because of any underlying evidence that they were un
safe.
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Instead of addressing this issue head-on, Berger and Twerski's informed
choice proposal seeks to provide either peace of mind from, or compensa
tion for, irrational, unsubstantiated fears and regrets. Thus, Betty Mekdeci
(and presumably thousands of others) should have been able to recover from
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals for her unsubstantiated fear that Bendectin
caused her son's birth defect and for her concomitant regret that she in.

gested B endecon.

1 17

The real victims of the Bendectin saga, meanwhile, were women who
unnecessarily became frightened that they had harmed their babies by taking
Bendectin (including those unfortunate few who aborted their unborn chil
dren); women who have gone without treatment for NVP because of the
litigation-induced withdrawal of Bendectin from the market and the accom
panying hysteria; women who continue to have a dearth of NVP treatments,
contraceptives, and other medical choices because medical companies have
learned from the Bendectin cases and other products liability litigation that
such products are "litogens" and therefore avoid them; and finally, Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, its shareholders, and its insurer, which faced pro
tracted and expensive litigation based on unsubstantiated and incorrect
allegations. These victims would find no comfort in Berger and Twerski's
proposal, which does not address the harm that victims of junk science
based litigation suffer. Nor does Berger and Twerski's proposal address how
to prevent the recurrence of such harms. Under Berger and Twerski's pro
posal, Merrell Dow would have been ruined financially even though the
company's marketing of Bendectin caused no injuries. By contrast, those
who have caused millions of American women to suffer unnecessarily by
promoting and pursuing unjustified litigation against Merrell Dow-Betty
Mekdeci, the Bendectin plaintiffs' attorneys, Public Citizen, the media, and
hired-gun expert witnesses-would have faced no repercussions for the
damage they caused. Berger and Twerski have misidentified the perpetra
tors, the victims, and indeed the very essence of the B endectin disaster. Not
surprisingly, then, they have learned the wrong lessons from an American
tragedy.

It's not reassuring that Berger and Twerski, though addressing a perceived safety prob
1 1 7.
lem involving complex scientific issues, cite virtually no scientific or medical literature, preferring
instead to rely on the work of law professors and judges. One of Daubert's most imponant achieve
ments has been to focus the attention of the legal community on the underlying scientific basis of
claims by experts, rather than relying on lay (or legal) notions of common sense in resolving scien
tific claims. Cf Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 747 (N .J. 1 99 1 ) (absurdly relying on
"common sense" for the proposition that PCBs cause colon cancer and foolishly relying on a law
student's note for the (incorrect) assertion that 80% of all cancers are caused by exposure to envi
ronmental toxins). By focusing attention, for example, on Betty Mekdeci's subjective feelings
instead of the evidence she relied on, Berger and Twerski are encouraging their readers to take a
giant step backwards to the pre-Daubert era.
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